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CASE NOTES
aid to religion regardless of the fact that the prayer may be nondenom-
inational. He sums the point up when he states:
It is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for
any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program
carried on by the government. 19
It certainly appears that the court's opinion is in keeping with the Everson
test. Here we have a religious exercise, the saying of a prayer, conducted
by the government at government expense. The expense is that of the
teacher who must read the prayer aloud. It amounts to nothing less than
government financing of a religious exercise. This, of course, is the main
prohibition laid down by the Everson test. Justice Douglas in writing a
concurring opinion stated the issue as "whether the government can con-
stitutionally finance a religious exercise. '20 Phrasing the issue in this way
is exactly in keeping with the Everson test and its reaffirmance by the
court in holding the prayer unconstitutional simply follows the philoso-
phy that government may not finance religious exercises which philoso-
phy has been formalized and sustained in the Everson, McCollum and
Zorach cases. The Engel decision could not have been decided otherwise
unless the court had been prepared to abandon the philosophy which
precedent dictated.
The lone dissenter in the Engel case, Justice Stewart, held that this
nondenominational "expression of religious faith in and reliance upon a
Supreme Being" 2' did not violate the "Establishment Clause" because it
follows "the deeply entrenched and highly cherished spiritual traditions
of our nation."'22 He also states that if the "Establishment Clause" meant
that government could not finance religious exercises, then the payment
of chaplains' fees in various areas of government would be unconstitu-
tional. By implication, he holds that the "Establishment Clause" does not
prohibit government financing of religious exercises. Justice Stewart,
thus, is willing to abandon the philosophy of the Everson test which has
been established by precedent. The majority of the court, as has been
shown, was unwilling to abandon this precedent.
1OEngel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
20id. at 437.
21 1d. at 450 (footnote 9). 22 d. at 450.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF STATE REAPPORTIONMENT
The Constitution of the State of Tennessee vests the legislative power
of that state in a General Assembly consisting of a House of Representa-
tives and a Senate. Each county of the state is to have senators and rep-
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resentatives according to their proportionate populations to be determined
by a decennial census. After this census the statutes to effect proper re-
apportionment are to be passed.' This procedure was followed through
1901 when statutes were passed to reapportion the state according to the
federal census, but since then all subsequent proposals for re-districting
have failed to pass the General Assembly. Since 1901 both the gross popu-
lation and the number of qualified voters have increased by approximately
one and one-half million, and the relative standing of the various counties
with respect to the proportion of qualified voters has changed drastically.2
Plaintiffs in this cause, all voters qualified to vote for members of the
Tennessee Legislature in their respective counties, brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to have
the 1901 apportionment act declared unconstitutional as violating the
Fourteenth Amendment, and for an injunction to restrain the defendant
state officials from proceeding further thereunder. More particularly it
was alleged: (1) that the 1901 statute reapportioned the state in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner without regard to the constitutional formula;
(2) that the change in the population of the state has rendered this statute
obsolete and unconstitutional; (3) that because of the composition of the
state legislature, redress in the form of state action is impossible; (4) that
as a result plaintiffs are denied equal protection of the law by the debase-
ment of their votes. A three-judge district court convened to hear the
case, dismissed the complaint on defendants' motion holding that8 it lacked
jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. It was not denied that a great
injustice was being done, but the court stated that on the basis of the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States,4 the question of the dis-
tribution of political strength for legislative purposes within a state was
not one of which the federal courts would take cognizance. On appeal the
Supreme Court of the United States, two justices dissenting and one not
taking part, reversed and remanded 5 holding that the district court had
1 TENN. CONST. art. 2, S 3, 4, 5, and 6.
2 Justice Clark's concurring opinion in the instant case contains an exhaustive statisti-
cal survey of the apportionment problem in Tennessee.
8 179 F. Supp. 824 (1959).
4Radford v. Gray, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956);
Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); South
v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1949); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); Colegrove v.
Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Turman v. Duck-
worth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
5 Justices Brennan wrote the opinion of the court; Justices Douglas, Clark and Stewart
concurred in separate opinions; Justices Frankfurter and Harlan dissented; Justice
Whittaker did not participate.
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jurisdiction of the subject matter, that a justiciable cause of action was
stated and that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the 1901 Tennessee
reapportionment statute. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Justice Brennan was meticulous in specifying the issues raised by the
appeal. Three were settled upon: (1) whether the district court had juris-
diction of the subject matter of the case, (2) whether the plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the Tennessee statute and (3) whether this subject
matter presented a justiciable cause of action. These first two are dismissed
with remarkable brevity.
Federal courts have jurisdiction of cases "arising under this Con-
stitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made or which shall
be made, under their Authority. . . ." It was first held that because the
complaint alleged a deprivation of equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment it stated a cause of action which plainly was within this pro-
vision. Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, therefore, would have been
justified only if the claim was so unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid
of merit. No such situation was found. A series of cases is then cited either
upholding jurisdiction of the subject matter in voting cases7 or deciding
them on the merits and thus assuming or implying such jurisdiction." The
majority even finds that Colegrove v. Green,9 the landmark case on this
topic until the instant case and the subsequent per curiam decisions 10 based
thereon, recognize by implication that there is jurisdiction of the subject
matter.
The question of standing to sue is treated in the same summary manner.
A citizen's right to vote without arbitrary impairment by state action is
established as a principle of prior cases.'1 Again reference is made to prior
apportionment cases 12 deciding the issues on their merits and thus im-
6 U.S. CONsT. art. III, S 2.
7 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); Wood
v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932); Mahan v. Hume, 287 U.S. 575 (1932); Davis v. Hildebrant,
241 U.S. 565 (1915).
8 Radford v. Gray, 353 U.S. 911 (1957); Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956);
Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1951); Colegrove
v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Turman v. Duck-
worth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946).
9 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
10 Radford v. Gray, 352 U.S. 981 (1957); Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956);
Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); South
v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1949); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); Colegrove v.
Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947).
11 United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1943); United States v. Classic 313 U.S. 299(1941); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1914); Ex Parte Siebold, 10 U.S. 371
(1879).
12 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); Carrol
v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
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pliedly recognizing that the parties had standing to sue. Colegrove v.
Green1' is this time taken squarely to hold that there is standing.
In contrast to the treatment of these first two issues, justiciability is
analysis in minute detail since the entire case turns on whether a voter's
challenging of his state's legislative apportionment involves a non-justicia-
ble "political question." As a preliminary consideration, Justice Brennan
emphasizes that no rigid set of fact situations, except those falling under
the Guaranty Clause,14 are held to involve political questions; each case
requires its own analysis and just because a controversy involves one's
political rights does not mean it involves a political question. 5 A survey is
made of the cases in which political questions are found: foreign relations,
dates of duration of hostilities, the validity of enactments, the status of the
Indian tribes, and cases arising under the Guaranty Clause.16 A cross-sec-
13 328 U.S. 549 (1946). Until the instant decision, Colegrove v. Green was the leading
case on federal interference in state apportionment. The case arose when a group of
citizens in Illinois attempted to enjoin the election of federal congressmen under the
Illinois apportionment act. With regard to the degree of discrimination and the con-
tentions of the plaintiffs, it was almost identical to the instant case. Only seven judges
were involved in the decision. Justice Frankfurter, with the concurrence of Justices
Burton and Reed, held that the case involved a political question since Congress was
the branch of the federal government that supervises the election of congressmen. But
going further, he held that the courts should not get involved in matters of politics
such as the case presented and thus diluted his opinion by equating politics with "politi-
cal questions." Justice Rutledge concurred with this result but on grounds which had
no relation to the existence of a political question. Justices Douglas, Black and Murphy
dissented on the grounds that a political question did not exist and that it was im-
material anyway since every citizen was guaranteed the right to vote and states cannot
discriminate against or in favor of one group of voters.
Because four out of seven justices concurred in the result, the dismissal of the com-
plaint by the district court was affirmed and Justice Frankfurter's opinion became the
opinion of the Court. Therefore, there is a question as to the weight to be placed on
this opinion. The two cases can also be distinguished on the grounds that in Colegrove
the question dealt with was the election of federal congressmen which admittedly Con-
gress does control. In the instant case, no other branch of the federal government is in-
volved. As a result, both cases may remain law in their respective fields and fact situ-
ations although on the surface, and according to Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion in this case, they involve the same issues and concepts.
14 U.S. CoNrs. art. IV, § 4. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against In-
vasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legisla-
ture cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) is the case which first determined that actions
based on the Guaranty Clause involved, as of their nature, a political question. Since
that time, the Supreme Court has refused to take jurisdiction over cases arising under
this clause, delegating all authority under it to the Executive branch. The only part
that this clause plays in the instant case is a determination that the cause of action al-
leged by the plaintiffs is not based thereon and that as a result it does not involve a
political question by reason thereof.
15 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1926).
16 369 U.S. 186, 211-26 (1961).
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tion of the cases in these areas is discussed to show that in some instances
political questions arise, and in others not.
As a result of this distillation, and taking into consideration the leading
case on the topic of political questions of Coleman v. Miller,17 a number
of criteria and characteristics of political questions are elucidated: (1) the
concept results from an attempt to preserve a separation of powers within
the federal government and does not involve the relationship of the fed-
eral government to the states; (2) no "judicially discoverable standards"'"
for resolving the conflict exist, and it is thus not amenable to the judicial
process of settling disputes; (3) in some situations no result is possible
without an initial policy determination which is not of a judicial nature
or within judicial discretion; (4) at times there is some requirement for
an unquestioning adherence to a prior political decision; (5) embarrass-
ment may result from multiple determinations of the same question by
various departments of the government. Thus, the court has established
objective criteria from past decisions, and by applying them to specific
fact situations we should be able to determine whether the issues in any
other case involve a non-justiciable political question. Such application in
this case leads Justice Brennan to find none.
The question here is the consistency of state action with the Federal Constitu-
tion. We have no question decided or to be decided, by a political branch of
government coequal with this Court. Nor do we risk embarrassment of our
government abroad, or grave disturbances at home if we take issue with
Tennessee as to the constitutionality of her action here challenged. Nor need
the appellants, in order to succeed in this action, ask the Court to enter upon
policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking.
Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and
familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a dis-
crimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.19
What are the consequences of this decision? Aside from the holdings on
jurisdiction, standing and justiciability, the case would seem to have no
other legal significance. Yet in effect, this decision removes the last ob-
stacle from the paths of the federal courts in controlling states' legislative
apportionment. This was not accomplished by a change in the basic pol-
icy or philosophy of constitutional law, but by a legalistic evaluation of
the facts involved and a stare decisis application of case law; no sweeping
judicial policy was announced and no new interpretation of the basic
concepts involved was made. Whether this decision shows a change in
these areas cannot be determined at this time.
One of the reasons for Justice Frankfurter's refusal in the Colegrove
17307 U.S. 433 (1938). 19 369 U.S. 186 at 226 (1961).
18 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961).
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case to allow the federal judiciary in this field was that after diligent
search and discussion he could find no guidelines to assist the federal dis-
trict courts in determining how to reapportion a state. Yet Justice Bren-
nan dismisses the subject without consideration, stating that
Beyond noting that we have no cause at this stage to doubt the District Court
will be able to fashion relief if violations of constitutional rights are found,
it is improper now to consider what remedy would be most appropriate if
appellants prevail at the trial.20
It will be interesting to see whether the federal district courts' experiences
in solving this problem will result in a future policy reversal or a major
change in the political character of a majority of the states in the union.
20 369 U.S. 186 (1961) at 198.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INSURANCE REGULATION-
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF STATES
Todd Shipyards Corporation, a New York corporation not domiciled
in Texas but doing business and owning property there, was taxed pur-
suant to Article 21.38 of the Texas Insurance Code. This article' requires
that a five per cent tax on gross premiums be paid by resident insureds on
policies of insurance purchased by them from "unauthorized insurers. ' 2
Todd insured its Texas property in New York City with Lloyd's of Lon-
don and Institute of Lloyd's Underwriters, both unauthorized insurers
within the meaning of the Code. Each of the insurance transactions in-
volved took place entirely outside the State of Texas. The policies were
negotiated, paid for, and issued outside Texas and all losses arising under
the policies were adjusted and paid for outside the state. The insurers had
no office or place of business in Texas, did not solicit business in Texas,
had no agents in Texas, and did not investigate risks or claims in Texas.
Todd Shipyards Corporation paid the required five per cent tax under
protest and brought an action against the State Board of Insurance to re-
1 14 VERNON's TEX. CIv. STAT. art. 21.38, S 2(e) (Supp. 1961). Section 2(e) states:
"If any person, firm, association or corporation shall purchase from an insurer not
licensed in the State of Texas a policy of insurance covering risks within this State in a
manner other than through an insurance agent licensed as such under the laws of the
State of Texas, such person, firm, association or corporation shall pay to the Board a
tax of five per cent (5%) of the amount of the gross premiums paid by such insured
for such insurance. Such tax shall be paid not later than thirty (30) days from the date
on which such premium is paid to the unlicensed insurer."
2An "unauthorized insurer" in the State of Texas is any insurance company not
licensed by the State Board of Insurance to do business in that State. 14 VERNON'S TEx.
Civ. STAT. art. 21.38, S 2(a) (Supp. 1961).
